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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900166 
v. : 
WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR., : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. t 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing 
is whether the Court overlooked relevant authority and misapplied 
the law in concluding that attempted depraved indifference murder 
does not exist in Utah because the "knowing" mental state 
required for depraved indifference murder is not sufficient under 
Utah's attempt statute. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr., was charged with one 
count of second degree murder, a first degree felony, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) (1990), and two counts of 
attempted second degree murder, a second degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. SS 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) and 76-4-101 (1990) (R. 6-
8). 
Defendant moved to dismiss the attempted second degree 
murder counts that were based on the depraved indifference 
alternative defined in section 76-5-203(1)(c) (R. 42-43). The 
trial court denied defendant's motion. 
Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal, 
requesting review of the trial court's denial of the motion to 
dismiss (R. 87-93). This Court granted the petition. 
On September 3, 1992, the Court issued an opinion which 
held that attempted depraved indifference murder does not exist 
in Utah because the "knowing" mental state required for depraved 
indifference murder is not sufficient under Utah's attempt 
statute. State v. Vigil, No. 900166 (Utah Sept. 3, 1992) (a copy 
is contained in the addendum to this petition). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State agrees with the statement of facts contained 
in the Court's opinion. Vigil, slip op. at 1-2. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In holding that attempted depraved indifference murder 
does not exist in Utah because a knowing mental state is not 
sufficient under Utah's attempt statute, the Court overlooked 
substantial authority from the Model Penal Code, the Utah Code in 
general, and its own case law. 
The Model Penal Code, upon which Utah's attempt statute 
is patterned, clearly adopts the view that an intentional or 
knowing mental state is sufficient for attempt. Both the 
legislature and this Court have recognized, particularly in the 
homicide context, that the intentional and knowing mental states 
are equivalent and equally culpable. Therefore, it is 
unreasonable to interpret the term "intent," as it is generically 
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used in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(2) (1990), to limit the reach 
of the attempt statute to offenses that require an intentional 
mental state. 
Consistent with the Model Penal Code and the 
acknowledgement by the legislature and this Court that the 
intentional and knowing mental states are equivalent and equally 
culpable, the fairest interpretation of Utah's attempt statute is 
that one can attempt to commit crimes that require either an 
intentional or knowing mental state. Accordingly, attempted 
depraved indifference murder exists in Utah. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has overlooked relevant authority or misapplied the law. See 
Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). 
The argument portion of this brief will demonstrate that the 
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and 
should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
IN HOLDING THAT ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE MURDER DOES NOT EXIST IN UTAH, 
THE COURT OVERLOOKED RELEVANT AUTHORITY AND 
MISAPPLIED THE LAW 
The Court correctly stated the issue presented in this 
case: "We are asked to determine whether proof of the 'knowing' 
mental state required for depraved indifference homicide under 
section 76-5-203(1)(c) of the Code is sufficient to satisfy the 
mental state required by Utah's attempt statute found in section 
76-4-101." Viail, slip op. at 2. It then construed section 76-
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4-101(2) as limiting the reach of the attempt provision to 
offenses that require an "intentional" mental state; one may not 
be convicted of an attempt if the underlying or target offense 
requires only a "knowing" mental state (as does depraved 
indifference murder), id. at 8-9. The Court specifically 
rejected the State's argument that the word "intent" in section 
76-4-101(2) be interpreted to mean an intentional mental state or 
one that is equivalent thereto (i.e., knowing mental state). Id. 
at 8. 
The Court reached its conclusion that a "knowing" 
mental state is insufficient despite acknowledging that the Model 
Penal Code's attempt provision, upon which Utah's attempt statute 
is patterned, "requires either intentional conduct or the belief 
that the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act." Id. 
at 6. Indeed, the Model Penal Code clearly adopts the view that 
a "knowing" mental state is sufficient for attempt, as 
illustrated in the following comment: 
Subsection (l)(b) [of § 5.01] provides 
that when causing a particular result is an 
element of the crime, as in homicide cases 
... ., an actor commits an attempt when he 
does or omits to do anything with the purpose 
of causing "or with the belief that it will 
cause" such result without further conduct on 
his part. Thus, a belief that death will 
ensue from the actor's conduct . . . will 
suffice, as would a purpose to bring about 
those results. If, for example, the actor's 
purpose were to demolish a building and, 
knowing that persons were in the building and 
they would be killed by the explosion, he 
nevertheless detonated a bomb that turned out 
to be defective, he could be prosecuted for 
attempted murder even though it was no part 
of his purpose that the inhabitants of the 
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building would be killed. 
It is difficult to say what the decision 
would be under prevailing attempt principles 
in a case of this kind. It might be held 
that the actor did not specifically intend to 
kill the inhabitants of the building; on the 
other hand, the concept of "intent" has 
always been an ambiguous one and might be 
thought to include results that the actor 
believed to be the inevitable consequence of 
his conduct. In any event, the inclusion of 
such conduct as the basis for liability under 
Subsection (l)(b) is based on the conclusion 
that the manifestation of the actor's 
dangerousness is just as great — or very 
nearly as great — as in the case of 
purposive conduct. In both instances a 
deliberate choice is made to bring about the 
consequence forbidden by the criminal laws, 
and the actor has done all within his power 
to cause this result to occur. The absence 
of any desire that the result occur is not, 
under the circumstances, a sufficient basis 
for differentiating between the two types of 
conduct involved. 
1 Amer. L. Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries,. 304-05 
(1985). 
The Model Penal Code's definition of "intent" as 
including both intentional (or "purposive") and knowing conduct 
is consistent with the generally accepted definition of that term 
in the criminal law. Black's Law Dictionary 373 (6th unabr. ed. 
1990) defines "criminal intent" as follows: 
The intent to commit a crime; malice, as 
evidenced by a criminal act; an intent to 
deprive or defraud the true owner of his 
property. Includes those consequences which 
represent the very purpose for which an act 
is done, regardless of the likelihood of 
occurrence, or are known to be substantially 
certain to result, regardless of desire* 
[Emphasis added.] In short, "criminal intent" includes 
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intentional and knowing mental states. 
In light of the Model Penal Code's definition of 
"intent" and the generally accepted definition of "intent" in the 
criminal law, the Court's narrow interpretation of that term as 
it is generically used in section 76-4-101(2) is unwarranted. 
The Court erroneously considered itself bound to define "intent" 
as used in subsection (2) in the same manner that "intentionally/ 
or with intent" are defined in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103(1) 
(1990). The terms appear in entirely different contexts and 
plainly refer to different concepts. 
Section 76-2-103(1) defines the intentional mental 
state for puarposes of specific conduct designated as criminal 
throughout the Code. The section provides meaning for the terms 
"intentionally, or with intent" when those terms are used to 
define the mental state for the conduct associated with a 
particular crime. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103(1) (1990) 
("A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or 
explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages . . . . " ) . 
On the other hand, the term "intent" is used 
generically in section 76-4-101(2). It does not define the 
mental state for a particular crime. Rather, it refers 
generically to the "criminal intent" required for the underlying 
or target offense attempted by the actor (which, of course, is 
separately defined elsewhere in the Code). The generic 
definition of "intent" in the criminal law is that contained in 
Black's Law Dictionary and adopted by the Model Penal Code (i.e., 
6 
intentional or knowing). 
Furthermore, defining "intent1* as used in section 76-4-
101(2) to include both intentional and knowing mental states is 
consistent with the obvious legislative conclusion that those 
mental states, while distinct, are equally culpable. See, e.g.. 
Utah Code Ann. SS 76-5-202(1) (aggravated murder if actor 
"intentionally or knowingly causes death of another") and 76-5-
203 (murder if actor "intentionally or knowingly causes the death 
of another") (Supp. 1992); Utah Code Ann. SS 76-5-301(1) ("A 
person commits kidnapping when he intentionally or knowingly . . 
. . " ) , S 76-9-301 ("A person commits cruelty to animals if he 
intentionally or knowingly . . . .") (1990). For criminal 
homicide, this Court has repeatedly recognized that the "knowing" 
mens rea for depraved indifference murder is " ' equ iva l en t to a 
"specific intent" [or a purpose] to kill.'" State v. Standiford, 
769 P.2d 254, 261 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Bolsinaer, 699 
P.2d 1214, 1220 (Utah 1985)). Given the clear recognition by 
both the legislature and this Court that the intentional and 
knowing mental states are equivalent, it is unreasonable to 
conclude that the legislature intended to limit the scope of the 
attempt provision to crimes that require intentional conduct, and 
to exclude those that require knowing conduct. 
Indeed, even this Court could not completely accept its 
narrow reading of section 76-4-101(2). In footnote 5 of its 
opinion, where State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982), is 
discussed, the Court noted that "Maestas is still good law 
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insofar as it authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated 
murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of sorption 
76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or h&owing 
formulation of section 76-5-203(1) (a) •" Vicril, slip op. at 8 n.5 
(emphasis added). Retention of Maestas for th^t proposition 
simply cannot be reconciled with the Court's holding that * 
"knowing" mental state is not sufficient under the a£temp£ 
statute. 
In sum, the most reasonable reading ftf Utah's attempt 
statute is that one can attempt to commit crimes tjiat require 
either an intentional or knowing mental state. Accordingly, 
attempted depraved indifference murder exists in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court showld grant 
rehearing and modify its opinion to conform to the fairest 
reading of Utah's attempt statute and this Court's own decisions, 
particularly Standiford and Maestas. Utah R. App. P. 35{c). 
The State certifies that this petitiQn is presented in 
good faith and not for delay.
 f 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^^day of September, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAH DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON V 
Assistant Attorney general 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 
Attorney for Defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this of September, 1992. 
A5%4*JL ji.y^Mnn^<r^^ 
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ADDENDUM 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900166 
F I L E D 
September 3, 1992 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, David B. Thompson, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff 
James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant 
ZIMMERMAN. Justice: 
Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr., appeals from a trial court order 
denying a motion he directed against two counts of an information 
filed against him. He moved to amend one count of attempted 
second degree murder and to dismiss a second count of attempted 
second degree murder. The sole question presented on appeal is 
whether the trial court correctly ruled that Vigil could be 
prosecuted for attempted second degree murder under the depraved 
indifference alternative of section 76-5-203(1)(c) of the Code. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (1990) (amended 1991).x We hold 
that Utah does not recognize attempted depraved indifference 
homicide and reverse the trial court order denying Vigil's 
motion. 
Because the facts are unimportant to the issue before 
us, we will summarize them briefly. Vigil was charged with one 
count of second degree murder, a first degree felony, id. 
§ 76-5-203(1)-(2), and two counts of attempted second degree 
murder, a second degree felony, id. §§ 76-5-203(1), -4-101, 
1
 In 1991, the legislature changed "second degree murder" to 
simply "murder" and "first degree murder" to "aggravated murder." 
1991 Utah Laws ch. 10, §§ 7-9 (codified as amended Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 75-5-201 to -203 (Supp. 1992)). 
-4-102(2). These counts arose out of his allegedly shooting a 
rifle into a crowd on State Street in Salt Lake City. The 
shooting resulted in the death of one person and the wounding of 
two others. Before trial, Vigil moved to amend one count of the 
information and dismiss another. The aim of the motion was 
to delete from the information anything that would allow the jury 
to find him guilty of attempted depraved indifference homicide. 
The trial court denied the motion, whereupon Vigil petitioned 
this court for permission to make an interlocutory appeal. We 
granted his request and now consider the correctness of the trial 
court's ruling. 
We first state the standard of review. The question of 
whether Utah recognizes attempted depraved indifference homicide 
is purely a matter of statutory interpretation. Therefore, we 
review the trial court's ruling for correctness and give no 
deference to its conclusions. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
516 (Utah), cert, denied, ill S. Ct. 120 (1990); Provo City Corp. 
v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
The issue before us is narrow. We are asked to 
determine whether proof of the "knowing" mental state required 
for depraved indifference homicide under section 76-5-203(1)(c) 
of the Code is sufficient to satisfy the mental state required by 
Utah's attempt statute found in section 76-4-101. If we find 
that the "knowing" mental state required for depraved 
indifference homicide is sufficient to satisfy the attempt 
statute, the State will be able to prosecute a defendant for 
attempt to commit depraved indifference homicide. 
We begin with the two statutes. The first is the 
second degree murder statute, which sets out several alternative 
formulations of second degree murder. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203(1) (1990) (amended 1991). The formulation we are 
concerned with is subparagraph (1)(c), the depraved indifference 
formulation. Subparagraph (1)(c), as construed by this court in 
State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 263-64 (Utah 1988), and State 
v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Utah 1984), provides that a 
defendant may be convicted of second degree murder if he or she 
killed another with a "knowing" mental state, i.e., if the 
defendant knew his or her conduct created a grave risk of death 
to another.2 
2
 In Standiford, we held that to convict a defendant of 
depraved indifference homicide, the jury must find "(1) that the 
defendant acted knowingly (2) in creating a grave risk of death, 
(3) that the defendant knew the risk of death was grave, 
(4) which means a highly likely probability of death, and 
(5) that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and 
indifference toward human life." 769 P.2d at 264. 
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The other statute of concern is the attempt statute, 
section 76-4-101. The mental state required by the attempt 
statute is found in the first two paragraphs, as indicated by 
emphasis below: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person 
is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, 
he [or she] engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the 
offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct 
does not constitute a substantial step unless 
it is strongly corroborative of the actor/s 
intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of 
attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was 
actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal 
impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances 
been as the actor believed them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (emphasis added). 
To determine whether the legislature intended to 
recognize attempted depraved indifference homicide, we begin with 
the statutes' plain language. We will resort to other methods of 
statutory interpretation only if we find the language of the 
statutes to be ambiguous. See Shurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 
P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 500 
(Utah 1989) (per curiam). 
Paragraph (1) of the attempt statute provides that an 
attempt can occur whenever the actor acts with the "kind of 
culpability otherwise required" for the completed crime and his 
or her act is a "substantial step" toward committing the crime. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1). Because the criminal code 
specifies four discrete mental states that may result in criminal 
liability, i.e., intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, 
id. § 76-2-101(1), the language in paragraph (1) seems to suggest 
that an attempt conviction may be based upon the incomplete 
perpetration of any of the crimes in the Code. 
On the other hand, paragraph (2) of the attempt statute 
states that the defendant's conduct must be corroborative of his 
or her "intent to commit the offense." Id. § 76-4-101(2). At 
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first blush, this provision appears to contradict the broad 
"culpability" language in paragraph (1). While paragraph (1) 
seems to allow for any mental state so long as it falls within 
the "kind of culpability otherwise required" for the underlying 
offense, paragraph (2) seems to require a mental state of 
"intent." 
However, closer examination indicates that paragraphs 
(1) and (2) are not contradictory. "Culpability," the term used 
in paragraph (1), and "intent," the term used in paragraph (2), 
are distinct concepts. Intent is a mental state. Blacks Law 
Dictionary 415 (5th abr. ed. 1983). Culpability, on the other 
hand, refers to blameworthiness, id. at 200; 25 C.J.S. 
Culpability (1966), a value society assigns to particular 
behaviors that it deems punishable. Culpability is an inclusive 
term that comprehends action or omissions, the mental state with 
which they are done, and the circumstances in which the acts or 
omissions take place. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, 
Jr., Criminal Law § 24 (1979) [hereinafter Criminal Law!. Thus, 
although culpability includes consideration of the actor/s mental 
state, it is a much broader concept than intent. See 25 C.J.S. 
Culpable (1966) (defining culpability as "deserving punishment 
. . . or blame or censure," but noting that it does not 
necessarily connote "guilt," "malice," or "guilty purpose").3 
With this distinction in mind, we interpret paragraphs 
(1) and (2) of section 76-4-101. In doing so, we rely on two 
well-established rules of statutory construction. Cf. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-106 (requiring terms to be construed according to 
their fair import). First, specific statutory provisions take 
precedence over general statutory provisions. E.g., Osuala v. 
Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). Second, 
statutory provisions should be construed to give full effect to 
all their terms. E.g., Shurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112. 
Applying these two rules to the attempt statute 
resolves the apparent contradiction between paragraphs (1) and 
(2). The more specific requirement of intent in paragraph (2) 
(i.e., "intent to commit the [underlying] offense") takes 
precedence over the general culpability requirement in paragraph 
(1) (i.e., "culpability otherwise required for the commission of 
the [underlying] offense"). And to give the fullest possible 
effect to the terms of paragraphs (1) and (2), we construe the 
culpability requirement in paragraph (1) to refer to the 
J
 We are aware that culpability is sometimes used inter-
changeably with mental state. However, we think that this usage 
is imprecise. 
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attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying offense and 
construe the intent language in paragraph (2) to limit the 
attempt statute to offenses with a mental state of "intent." In 
other words, attempt can be found for uncompleted offenses that 
4
 "Attendant circumstances" are those circumstances that may 
be required to be present for criminal liability in addition to 
the requisite physical conduct, or actus reus, and the mens rea 
specified for the offense. See Criminal Law § 34, at 237, 
240-41. In general, mens rea means "guilty mind," that attribute 
which, along with physical conduct, was required for criminal 
liability under common law, see id. § 27, at 191-92, and is now 
required by statute except for strict liability offenses. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1) ("[N]o person is guilty of an 
offense unless his [or her] conduct is prohibited by law and 
. . . [h]e [or she] acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, 
with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise 
specified . . . . " ) . The mens rea is the mental state required 
in all homicide offenses for criminal liability. See id. 
§ 76-2-102 ("Every offense not involving strict liability shall 
require a culpable mental state . . . . " ) ; id. § 76-5-201 ("A 
person commits criminal homicide if he [or she] intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a 
mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense, causes the death of another human being, including an 
unborn child."). 
Occasionally, an offense may require a certain mental state 
for an attendant circumstance. For example, under section 
76-5-202(1)(k) of the current Code, a person is guilty of 
aggravated murder ("first degree murder" under the 1990 statute) 
if he or she intentionally or knowingly causes the death of a 
police officer acting in an official capacity and the person knew 
or "reasonably should have known" that the decedent was a police 
officer. Id. § 76-5-202(1)(k). The mens rea element for this 
offense is intent or knowledge, whereas the attendant 
circumstance that the decedent was a police officer requires at 
least a negligent mental state. Some offenses do not have 
attendant circumstances, such as the intentional or knowing 
formulation of murder ("second degree murder" under the 1990 
statute), which requires only conduct that intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another. Id. § 76-5-203(1)(a). 
Other offenses that do have attendant circumstances may not 
require a mental state for one or all of those circumstances. An 
example of the latter type of offense is the depraved 
indifference formulation of murder, which requires that the 
defendant act "under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life." Id. § 76-5-203(1)(c). The 
defendant's mental state under this provision is irrelevant to 
the determination of this attendant circumstance; it refers 
solely to objective circumstances. Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1045, 
1047. See generally Criminal Law § 27, at 194-95. 
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require "intent/1 even though those offenses have attendant 
circumstances that require lesser mental states. 
Our construction of Utah's attempt statute finds 
support in the attempt provisions of the Model Penal Code ("MPC") 
and the 1971 Proposed Federal Criminal Code (flPFCC"), both of 
which served as bases for the Utah provision. See State v. 
Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (noting that 
the Utah attempt statute was modeled after the MPC version); 
Loren Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline 169 (1973) (noting that 
the Utah attempt statute was modeled after section 1001 of the 
PFCC); cf. 1 National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal 
Laws, Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws 351-52 (1970) (relying on the stated 
purposes of the MPC attempt provision as the current penalogical 
thinking) [hereinafter National Commission Working Papers]. 
Both the MPC and PFCC provisions include two phrases 
regarding the requisite mental states for attempt that are the 
same as or analogous to the provisions of the Utah attempt 
statute. One phrase is the "kind of culpability otherwise 
required" that is also used in paragraph (1) of the Utah attempt 
statute. The other phrase specifies the mental state necessary 
for the conduct that constitutes the substantial step, which 
corresponds to the "intent" requirement in paragraph (2) of the 
Utah attempt statute. See Model Penal Code § 5.01(1), (2), 
reproduced in 1 Amer. L. Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries 
295-96 (1985) [hereinafter MPC Commentaries1; Proposed Federal 
Criminal Code § 1001(1), reproduced in 1 National Commission on 
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report of the National 
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 6 (1971). The 
commentaries to the MPC and PFCC attempt provisions indicate that 
the clause requiring the "kind of culpability otherwise required" 
for commission of the offense refers to the attendant 
circumstances of the underlying offense and the requisite mental 
states for those circumstances. See MPC Commentaries § 5.01, at 
301, 303; National Commission Working Papers at 355. In 
contrast, the commentaries make clear that both the MPC and PFCC 
attempt provisions require a more culpable mental state than 
recklessness for conduct that creates the substantial step. The 
PFCC attempt provision requires intentional conduct, National 
Commission Working Papers at 354 & n.6, and the MPC attempt 
provision requires either intentional conduct or the belief that 
the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act. MPC 
Commentaries § 5.01, at 303. 
Despite the foregoing support for limiting the Utah 
attempt provision to offenses requiring intent, the State argues 
that we should define "intent" in paragraph (2) of the attempt 
statute broadly to include purposeful intent and "equivalent" 
mental states, specifically, that required for depraved 
indifference homicide. The State reasons that this makes sense 
from a policy standpoint because the culpability of a person 
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convicted of depraved indifference second degree murder is the 
same as the culpability of a person convicted of intentional 
second degree murder. See Standiford, 769 P.2d at 258; Fontana. 
680 P.2d at 1045. In shortf the State argues that the degree of 
the murder (i.e., "first" or "second") is a measure of the 
societal judgment about the criminal's culpability and therefore 
murders of equal degree should be treated similarly. 
Notwithstanding the apparent logic of this argument, 
the State's suggested interpretation of "intent" in paragraph (2) 
of the attempt statute is contrary to the definition given to it 
by the legislature. Section 76-2-103(1) of the Code states that 
a person engages in conduct intentionally "with respect to the 
nature of his [or her] conduct or to the result of his [or her] 
conduct, when it is his [or her] conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(1) (emphasis added). Normally, we presume that when 
the legislature defines a term of art and later uses that term in 
the same body of statutes, it intends a consistent meaning. 
E.g.. Cannon v. McDonald. 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1980). 
Accordingly, the word "intent" as used in paragraph (2) of the 
attempt statute should be read to mean "conscious objective or 
desire." This meaning of the word "intent" obviously is 
distinguishable from knowledge of the proscribed conduct or 
result, which is the mental state required for depraved 
indifference homicide. 
Moreover, the State's position is inconsistent with our 
prior decisions. In State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), we 
addressed the question of whether there could be attempted 
felony-murder under subparagraph (d) of the second degree murder 
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(d) (Supp. 1989) (amended 
1991). We said no, reasoning that "[t]he crime of attempted 
murder does not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an 
attempt to commit a crime requires proof of an intent to 
consummate the crime . . . ." 785 P.2d at 393 (emphasis added). 
In two other cases, we considered attempt in the 
context of Utah's manslaughter statute, which sets out three 
alternative formulations of manslaughter. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-205. Under this statute, manslaughter may arise where the 
actor (i) recklessly causes death, id. § 76-5-205(1)(a), 
(ii) causes death under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance, id. § 76-5-205(1)(b), or (iii) causes death under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably believes that his or her 
conduct is legally justifiable. Id. § 76-5-205(1)(c). 
In State v. Norman. 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), we 
addressed the first two formulations. We held that an attempt 
cannot be charged where the attempted crime is the form of 
manslaughter described in subparagraph (a) of the statute because 
that formulation requires only the mental state of recklessness, 
whereas "[a]n attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the 
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intent to commit that crime . . . .fl Id. at 239 (emphasis 
added). Regarding subparagraph (b), we held that attempted 
manslaughter is possible under this formulation because "the 
killing may be intentional but due to mental or emotional 
disturbance on the part of the defendant." Id. at 240 (emphasis 
added). 
We addressed the third formulation in State v. Howell, 
649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982). There we held that attempted 
manslaughter can be charged for a crime described under 
subparagraph (c) of the manslaughter statute because the killing 
proscribed under that provision must be "intentional." Id. at 94 
(emphasis added). We again noted that "one cannot be guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the 
completed crime is intentional conduct." Id. at 94 n.l (emphasis 
added).5 
At bottom, the State seeks to replace the word "intent" 
in paragraph (2) of the attempt statute with, as it says, "intent 
or a mental state that is equivalent thereto" and to modify or 
reject the holdings of Bell, Norman, and Howell. Although it may 
make sense to allow attempt for homicide offenses that are 
presumably equal in culpability to intentional murder, we believe 
that the most reasonable approach, in light of the statutory 
language and our cases, is to read the word "intent" in 
paragraph (2) of the attempt statute as that word is defined in 
section 76-2-103(1). 
5
 In State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (1982), we rejected an 
argument that the Utah attempt statute required a higher level of 
"intent" than that required for first degree murder. In so 
holding, we interpreted paragraph (1) of the Utah attempt statute 
as making "clear that regardless of any requirements which the 
common law may impose concerning %attempt' crimes, Utah law 
requires only *the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the [completed] offense.,M Id. at 904 (brackets in 
original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1953)). 
Alternatively, we wrote that even if the Utah attempt statute 
incorporated the common law requirement of intent, the mental 
state required for first degree murder was sufficient to meet 
that requirement. Id. at 905. 
The first alternative rationale relied on in Maestas is 
clearly inconsistent with our cases in Bell, Howellf and Norman 
and with our holding in the instant case. Thus, that portion of 
Maestas that conflicts with these cases and today's holding is 
incorrect. However, we note that Maestas is still good law 
insofar as it authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated 
murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 
76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or knowing 
formulation of section 76-5-203(1)(a). 
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Clarity is crucial to a just criminal law system. 
Jurors are instructed to apply the language set forth in our 
penal statutes to determine criminal liability. Articulating the 
various mental states required for the various crimes in the Code 
is difficult enough without giving multiple meanings to the word 
"intent." 
We hold that to convict a defendant of attempted second 
degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had 
a conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another. 
Because the mental state required for depraved indifference 
homicide falls short of that intent, the crime of attempted 
depraved indifference homicide does not exist in Utah. 
The order of the trial court denying Vigil's motion to 
dismiss and amend is reversed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
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